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1 Introduction
I  am grateful  to  Sascha  Benjamin  Fink  for  a
thoughtful and insightful critique (Fink 2015) of
my article (Block 2015). Fink’s critique is full of
novel and interesting ideas, formulations and pro-
posals but is far too rich for me to respond to
everything. I will focus on Fink’s arguments to
the effect that the concept of phenomenal preci-
sion is defective because there will be no unique
precision to a phenomenal experience, specifically
that phenomenal precision is either contradictory
or trivialized by a “minimal” or “maximal” inter-
pretation. I think Fink is right to focus on the
concept of phenomenal precision since as he says
it is the aspect of my paper that most needs clari-
fication. I argue that the key to solving the prob-
lem that Fink raises is to ask what the represent-
ationist should say about it. I then argue that the
anti-representationist can make a similar move. In
the last section I consider some variants of Fink’s
proposal for how to clarify phenomenal precision.
2 The thesis of solely generic 
phenomenology 
I will start with the SGP thesis in Fink’s ter-
minology—the thesis that there can be “solely
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generic phenomenology”. An example would be
the experience of something as red without an
experience as of any specific shade of red. Fink
says I am forced to accept solely generic phe-
nomenology but that it “has been introduced to
argue against Block” (p. 10). 
Fink is talking about my “overflow” argu-
ments. These arguments are based partly on an
experiment by George Sperling (Sperling 1960)
that is  covered in all  respectable introductory
psychology  courses  and  on  experiments  from
Victor  Lamme’s  lab in  Amsterdam that  com-
bine Sperling with “change blindness” (Lamme
2003). The upshot of these lines of research is
that there is more “capacity” in phenomenology
than in cognition—or so I have argued. In the
Sperling  experiment  ,  subjects  are  presented
briefly with an array of letters, for example, 3
rows of 4 letters. Subjects say they see all or al-
most all of the letters but when asked to name
the letters they saw after the stimulus has dis-
appeared they can name only 3 or 4. Sperling’s
innovation was to “cue” subjects to report one
specific row after the offset of the stimulus, us-
ing a tone to indicate the row. The finding is
that subjects can report 3 or 4 items from any
given row, supporting the idea that their phe-
nomenal  “iconic”  representation  really  did  in-
clude information about the specific shapes of
all or almost all the letters in the array.
In  Lamme’s  experiments  the  subject  is
briefly shown an array of, for example, 8 ori-
ented rectangles. After the array is turned off,
the screen goes dark for up to 4 seconds, then
there is a second array of 8 rectangles in which
one of the rectangles may have a different ori-
entation (e.g., vertical rather than horizontal).
A cue—a line pointing to the location of one of
the  rectangles—can  occur  when  the  screen  is
dark  or,  alternatively,  when  the  second  array
appears.  The subject’s task is to say whether
the rectangle in the cued location has changed
orientation.  If  there  is  no  cue  or  if  the  cue
comes after the new array has overwritten the
iconic representation of the first array, subjects
have a capacity of about 4 items. But subjects
say they have a kind of image of the array in
the dark period after the stimulus has gone off.
When the cue is presented in the dark period
(up to 4 seconds later in some versions) after
the stimulus has gone off they have a capacity
of up to 7 of 8 items. I have argued that this
pattern of results indicates that subjects have a
persisting conscious mental iconic or imagistic
representation of 7 of the 8 rectangles of suffi-
cient specificity to compare orientations of the
initial rectangles with the final display of rect-
angles  even  though  they  can  “cognize”  only
about 4 of them—in the sense of storing them
briefly  in  “working  memory”.  The  upshot  ac-
cording to me is that there is more capacity in
the  phenomenal  iconic  representation  than  in
cognition and thus that phenomenology “over-
flows” cognition.1 
The subjects report seeing all or almost all
of the items and the cuing experiments—show-
ing as they do “partial report superiority”—ap-
pear to back up what the subjects say. However,
as Fink notes, my opponents2 criticize my ap-
peal to what the subjects say about their exper-
ience (Byrne et al. 2007). What is in the sub-
jects’ consciousness might be just a generic rep-
resentation—e.g.,  indicating  that  there  is  a
circle of rectangles or array of letters without
indicating the specific orientations of the rect-
angles or specific shapes of the letters. After all,
we can’t expect naïve subjects to have a grip on
the  distinction  between  generic  and  specific
phenomenology. Subjects say they have an im-
age of all or almost all the items because they
have a solely generic representation i.e., a rep-
resentation  that  specifies  the  location  of  the
items and their abstract category (letters, rect-
angles) but without the specific details (letter
identity, orientation). 
How  do  my  opponents  explain  the  fact
that the subjects can get 7 of 8 rectangles right
and 3 to 4 letters from any cued row if their
phenomenal icons do not contain the specific in-
formation needed to do these tasks? According
1 For experiments from the Lamme lab, see (Sligte et al. 2008,  2010,
2011; Vandenbroucke et al. 2011). This result has been replicated by
other labs. See for example, (Freeman & Pelli 2007). My discussions
of these experiments appear in (Block 2007a, 2007b, 2008). See also
(Jacobson 2014) for a discussion of a different relationship between
the dissociation between access and phenomenal consciousness and
the dissociation between phenomenal character and representational
content.
2 He references (Grush 2007) but the point is also made in other cri-
tiques (Kouider et al. 2007; Papineau 2007; Van Gulick 2007)
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to these opponents,  the specific details  of the
shapes are registered unconsciously. And when
subjects think they are reading details off of an
already present conscious image, what they are
really doing is making unconscious details con-
scious (Phillips 2011). Fink concludes that “Al-
lowing SGP thus blocks Block.” (p. 10)
My  response  to  Fink  consists  of  three
points: (1) my argument for “overflow” does not
require  any blanket  rejection of  solely  generic
phenomenology. (2) I have not issued any such
blanket rejection and I have given qualified en-
dorsement of some kinds of solely generic phe-
nomenology. (3) I think there are some crucial
cases—notably some spatial geometry cases in
which  there  is  reason to  doubt  solely  generic
phenomenology. I will explain these points.3
Why does Fink suppose I  cannot  accept
generic without specific phenomenology? Part of
his argument is that for an imagistic representa-
tion  there  cannot  be  generic  without  specific
phenomenology because images are “concrete”.
He says 
Imagistic representation… does  not  allow
for such indeterminacy, because images ex-
ploit  the  isomorphisms  between
concreta….Introspectively, our phenomenal
experiences  resemble  images.  If  phenom-
enal experience represents image-like, then
there  cannot  be  SGP—and  p-precision
seems dangerously close to being trivial; if
phenomenal  experience  is  non-imagistic,
3 For the record, I used the generic/specific distinction in earlier pa-
pers (though not using that terminology including the one that these
critics were replying to. For example, in discussing the Lamme ex-
periment in the BBS paper to which all of these opponents were
replying (Block 2007a), I said: 
This supports what the subjects say, and what William James said,
about the phenomenology involved in this kind of case. What is both
phenomenal  and  accessible  is  that  there  is  a  circle  of  rectangles.
What is phenomenal but in a sense not accessible, is all the specific
shapes of the rectangles. (p. 488) 
The phenomenology as of a circle of rectangles is generic phenomeno-
logy; the phenomenology as of  the specific shapes is  specific phe-
nomenology. Further, in an earlier version of the argument based on
the Sperling experiment in 1995 I also appealed to a version of the
generic/specific distinction, although somewhat less explicitly (Block
1995, p. 244) 
Here is  the description I  think is  right and that I need for my
case:  I  am P- conscious of all  (or almost all  -  I will  omit this
qualification) the letters at once, that is, jointly, and not just as
blurry or vague letters, but as specific letters (or at least specific
shapes), but I don’t have access to all of them jointly, all at once.
[italics added]
then we can allow for SGP and render p-
precision non-trivial—but this is in tension
with some of Block’s other work and our
introspective evidence. (p. 10) 
A similar argument to his was made by Robert
Van Gulick (2007) and in a different form by
Rick Grush. Van Gulick says
If one holds a “movie screen of the mind”
model  of  phenomenal  consciousness,  it
may seem impossible that there could be
letters  that  are  phenomenally  present  as
letters  without  being  present  as  specific
letter shapes. But such a model is at best
problematic,  and  if  one  rejects  it,  then
there seems no reason why the characters
of which the subjects are aware could not
be  indeterminate  in  ways  that  exactly
match  their  limited  cognitive  access  to
those features. (p. 529)
In my 2007 reply to Van Gulick I rejected this
argument  and—contrary  to  what  Fink  says
about  my  argument—I  endorsed  a  version  of
the SGP. I said
Van Gulick notes that the “movie screen
of  the  mind”  view  would  say  that  you
cannot  have  generic  phenomenology
without  specific  phenomenology,  impli-
citly suggesting that I am relying on the
“movie screen of the mind” view, and on
the fact of generic phenomenology, to ar-
gue  for  specific  phenomenology…I  reject
the principle – applied by … Van Gulick
–  that  pictorial  representation  has  to
specify  the  relevant  details.  I  call  this
principle  the  “photographic  fallacy”
(Block 1983). More specifically, the pho-
tographic fallacy supposes that pictorial
representations have to represent details
of anything in view in the manner of a
prototypical photograph. To see the fal-
lacy,  note  that  an  impressionist  painter
might  represent  a  hand in  broad brush
strokes  that  do  not  explicitly  represent
the number of fingers or whether one of
them has a ring. (Block 2007b, p. 533)
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It may be said that endorsing generic without
specific phenomenology on my part is just inco-
herent since it undermines my own position. Re-
call that the reason Fink says I cannot endorse
generic without specific phenomenology is that
my opponents use it to argue that what is in
consciousness in the Sperling and Lamme exper-
iments is solely generic, the specific details be-
ing perceived unconsciously.  My approach has
not been to issue a blanket denial of the possib-
ility of solely generic phenomenology but rather
to argue against the claim that the highly spe-
cific  representations  in  these  experiments  are
unconscious (Block 2007a, 2011, 2014b).4 
Is solely generic phenomenology possible?
There  certainly  are  some  intuitively  plausible
(though not compelling) cases. For example, if
one sees a red thing in the distance one may
perhaps see it as red without seeing it as having
any specific shade of red. (See  Stazicker 2011,
forthcoming for defenses of solely generic phe-
nomenology.) However, even if there is generic
phenomenology, I think it is doubtful in some
cases, notably certain spatial cases. In particu-
lar,  I  doubt  that  there  can  be  generic  phe-
nomenology of an oriented rectangle that does
not  specify  the rough orientation of  the rect-
angle.5 
My rationale for this view is partly intro-
spective and partly a result of informal reports
of imagery experiments from Stephen Kosslyn. I
have discussed doing experiments on this issue
with Kosslyn and Dan Reisberg. 
Imagine  that  you  are  in  a  house,  going
down the stairs and out the front door. In front
of you is a picket fence with a gate. You go out
through the gate and walk to the corner where
you mail a letter. 
4 If you want to get a brief taste of the kind of argument I have in
mind, look at one of: (Block 2014a,  2014b). In one of the articles
cited (Bronfman et al. 2014), evidence is provided of specific inform-
ation about uncued rows in a Sperling-like experiment. What I espe-
cially like about this experiment is that the authors provide 3 differ-
ent tests of the claim that the specific information in the uncued
rows is conscious.
5 In (Block 2011), I said “…generic conscious representations of non-
square rectangles that do not specify between horizontal and vertical
orientations is difficult to accept.” Note that this is not a blanket
denial of the possibility of solely generic phenomenology but rather a
denial of one specific kind of solely generic phenomenology. Hilla Jac-
obson and Hilary Putnam relate this kind of point about imagery to
a principle of “cohesiveness” of the various aspects of an image (Jac-
obson & Putnam forthcoming).
Stop now and answer the question: which
way did you turn when you went out through the
gate? Kosslyn reports in conversation that when
he gives such spatial vignettes to subjects they do
not report that there was no particular direction.
The experimental challenge is to design an experi-
ment that distinguishes between an answer made
up on the fly and an answer based on what was
“already there” in the image.
To summarize so far: Fink says “Allowing
SGP thus blocks Block.” I reply that my argu-
ment  for  “overflow”  does  not  require  any
blanket rejection of  solely generic phenomeno-
logy; that I have not issued any such blanket re-
jection; that I have endorsed the possibility of
solely generic phenomenology; and that I think
there  are  some  specific  cases  in  which  solely
generic phenomenology is not very plausible.
3 Is the concept of phenomenal precision
incoherent?
According to Fink, if there is no solely generic
phenomenology  (i.e.,  generic  without  specific
phenomenology)  then the  concept  of  phenom-
enal  precision  is  threatened  by  incoherence.
What  is  Fink’s  argument  for  this  conclusion?
Suppose there is no solely generic phenomeno-
logy. Then, according to Fink, “…the p-precision
of an experience is either contradictory, gener-
ally minimal, or generally maximal, which trivi-
alizes the notion.” (p. 9) And why is that? Be-
cause, according to Fink, if you experience the
color of his Figure 2 as cayenne66, then if you
also experience it as red, then there will be no
unique precision to the experience. For red has
a much wider precision range (i.e., lower preci-
sion) than cayenne66. His solution is to allow for
experiencing it as red without experiencing it as
any specific shade: generic without specific phe-
nomenology.6 
Let us approach this issue by asking what
the representationist should say by way of re-
sponse to Fink’s concern that there will be no
unique  visual  precision.  Then  we  can  ask
whether some version of that response is avail-
able to me.
6 Of course uniqueness does not require solely generic or solely specific
phenomenology. Any sole level will do.
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Recall  that  representationists  must  ac-
knowledge phenomenal precision (assuming they
acknowledge representational precision) since on
their  view,  if  the representational  precision of
one  conscious  perceptual  representation  is
greater  than  the  representational  precision  of
another  conscious  perceptual  representation,
then  the  phenomenal  precisions  must  follow
suit.  Phenomenal  precision—on their  view—is
just  the  shadow  of  representational  precision.
But  when  we  see  a  cayenne66 object  as  cay-
enne66, do we thereby also see it as red? It is of-
ten supposed that this is some sort of necessity
(Confession: I once thought that). To his credit,
Fink points out that this is false. He says (foot-
note 17):
Conceptual  or  nomological  relations  do
not necessarily transfer to the realm of ex-
periences. Imagine seeing an animal as a
mouse. One does not thereby see it as an
owner of a heart, or as a member of the
phylum chordata even though all mice be-
long to each category necessarily.7
Certainly Fink is right that seeing something as
a mouse does not require seeing it as a chord-
ate. However, he thinks any experience of cay-
enne66  is “likely” to be an experience of red. He
doesn’t say how he knows this. 
Here is a tempting but wrong view that I
believe may stand behind what Fink says (and
is also exemplified I believe in Begby 2011 and
in a more complex form in Siegel 2010). Look at
the cayenne66  patch in Fink’s Figure 2. I know
what a red thing looks like and I can tell from
looking that it is red because…well…it looks red.
So I  visually represent it  as  red. Similarly,  it
looks colored. And a baseball bat looks like a
baseball bat, so I visually represent it as a base-
ball bat.
However, I also know what a 1969 Chevro-
let Camaro looks like, as well as what a 1961
Jaguar E-type looks like. Do I thereby visually
represent the property of being a 1969 Camaro
or a 1961 E-type? I know what my wife looks
7 By “owner of a heart” he must mean some sort of biological classific-
ation (on a par with chordate) since obviously any individual mouse
could lose its heart (even briefly staying alive) and still be a mouse.
like. Do I thereby have a singular visual repres-
entation  that  represents  her?  Perhaps  what  I
am really visually representing in each of these
cases is just constellations of low level proper-
ties  that  are  recognitionally  equivalent  to the
property of being a 1961 Jaguar E-type or to
the singular property of being my wife. 
I have argued that the extent of seeing-as
in  the  sense  of  visual  representation is  not  a
matter  for  the  armchair  (Block 2014c).  From
the armchair one does not know whether some-
thing’s looking like a 1961 Jaguar E-type is a
matter of representation of constellations of col-
ors, shapes, textures, illumination, motion and
other low level properties as opposed to an ac-
tual representation of the property of being a
1961 Jaguar E-type.
For example, I give evidence that we can
visually represent facial expressions (high level
property) and in addition constellations of col-
ors, shapes, textures, etc. (low-level properties).
The evidence is that there are distinct “adapta-
tion”  effects  for  both  the  low  and  high-level
properties. (Adaptation is the neural “fatigue”
effect underlying afterimages.) For example, if
you vary the low level properties but keep the
face  identity  (or  expression  or  just  faceness)
constant,  you  get  smaller  adaptation  effects,
showing an extent of low level perception. And
the fact that there is a residual face adaptation
effect is one of many items of evidence favoring
face-specific perception.
You can experience such an adaptation ef-
fect  for  yourself.  Stare  at  the  picture  on  the
right for 1 minute, covering the two pictures on
the left with something. Then very briefly look
at the center picture asking yourself whether it
looks more fearful or more angry. Now cover the
two pictures on the right and stare at the pic-
ture on the left for one minute. Now look at the
center picture very briefly again. It will appear
to have a different expression. The center pic-
ture is a morph of a fearful face and an angry
face. When you adapt to the fearful expression
you are more likely to see the morph as angry-
looking  and  conversely  for  adapting  to  the
angry expression. This doesn’t prove that there
is an adaptation effect for facial expression over
and above adaptation effects for constellations
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of low level properties. The best one can do is
form  hypotheses  about  what  those  low  level
properties might be and vary those properties
keeping expressions constant. 
In addition, one can look for other signs of
visual  representation of  faces or facial  expres-
sions. For example, faces show “visual popout”.
Since typically “conjunctive” properties do not
show  visual  popout,  that  fact  suggests  that
visual  representations  of  faces  are  not  “con-
junctive” properties and hence not conjunctions
of  low level  features.  The upshot  of  this  and
other work I cannot describe here (Block 2014c)
is that it is very likely that there are representa-
tions of face-attributes such as facial expressions
in addition to representations of low level prop-
erties.8
Figure 1: From Butler et al. (2008) with permission of
Elsevier
The  upshot  of  all  this  is  that  a  single
visual experience can represent both low level
properties and high level properties.  So: there
can be distinct precisions for the different rep-
resentations. For example, the precision of the
experiential  representation of  fearfulness  could
be ascertained by investigating how much vari-
ation  in  the  percentage  of  fearfulness  in  a
morph like the middle one in the figure above is
compatible with exactly the same visual repres-
entation  of  fearfulness.  And  similar  methods
could be used to ascertain precisions for the low
level properties that are represented. There is
no reason to expect these precisions to be the
same.
An  experience  that  represents  cayenne66
could also represent red and there could be dis-
8 In his reply to me (2014), Burge is more skeptical than I am about
the power of appeals to adaptation, arguing that adaptation needs to
be combined with other methods.
tinct  precisions  for  each  of  these  representa-
tions. And what goes for representational preci-
sion  also  works  for  phenomenal  precision.  If
more than one property is genuinely present in
phenomenology then there can be distinct preci-
sions for the distinct properties. So the solution
for the representationist works even if represent-
ationism is false.
So why is there supposed to be a problem
concerning  unique  precisions?  Fink  argues  as
follows
You might think that this color experience
has two p-precision values: The first value
is  for  being  experienced  as red,  and the
second for being experienced as cayenne66.
But this seems contradictory: why should
one  and  the  same  experience  of  a  color
have two p-precision values, but only one
for r-precision? And for that matter, why
not three values for p-precision? You likely
experience the color not only as cayenne66
and as red, but also as a color? Why not
four, then, if you experience it as a visual
experience? Or five, if you experience it as
something? Or even six, if you experience
it as phenomenal? [NB: p-precision is phe-
nomenal precision; r-precision is represent-
ational precision]
The argument is not spelled out but one can
guess that it depends on the idea that there is
incoherence because there is no end to the num-
ber of properties that are present in experience.
(Fink seems to suppose that there are not mul-
tiple  representational  precisions  but  does  not
say why.) We don’t need to see exactly what the
argument  is  supposed  to  be  to  see  that  this
premise is wrong. There is absolutely no evid-
ence that experiences of colors present (or rep-
resent) colors as colors or as something or as
phenomenal. These presentations and represent-
ations cannot be simply postulated. The reason
that I went through the example of fearfulness
was  to  give  the  reader  a  sense  of  how much
work has to be done to show representation of a
high level property. The problem in Fink’s argu-
ment is the assumption that you “likely” experi-
ence his Figure 2 not only as cayenne66 but as a
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color and the insinuation—not explicitly stated
—that you experience it  as something and as
phenomenal. There is simply no reason to be-
lieve this.
On my view, color experience—like all per-
ceptual experience—is non-conceptual. But the
point is even stronger if color experience is con-
ceptual since then the concept of color and the
concept of something would be required to see
the cayenne66 patch as colored and as something.
Ask yourself whether an animal that can visu-
ally  represent  the  color  patch  in  Figure  2  as
cayenne66 must  also  represent  it  as  red  or  as
colored. Must the animal be able to attend to
or notice the redness or the coloredness as well
as the specific shade? Or consider 4 month old
human babies whose color perception is known
to be good but who do not appear to notice col-
ors to the extent of being able to use color in-
formation to judge whether there is one or two
items. Even two year old children are so bad at
conceptualizing color that a term was coined in
the early 20th Century, “farbendummeit” (color
stupidity), to describe their cluelessness. Darwin
thought his own children were color-blind be-
cause they were so poor at learning color names
(Bornstein 1985; Campbell 2014).
To  conclude  this  section:  uniqueness  of
precision is not required for coherence. The rep-
resentationist  can reasonably hold that to the
extent that there is more than one representa-
tional content, there is more than one precision:
precision  of  representation  depends  on  what
representation is in question. And the same can
be said of what properties are presented in per-
ception as opposed to represented in perception,
even if as I argue, representationism is false.
4 How not to clarify phenomenal 
precision
Here is a tempting idea about representational
precision.  Representational  precision  is  just  a
matter  of  how much the stimulus can change
without  changing  the  representational  content
of  the  subsequent  perception.  And  the  same
idea extends to phenomenal precision: phenom-
enal precision is a matter of how much the stim-
ulus can change without changing the phenom-
enal character of the perceptual state. Of course
these ideas would not be useful if one included
stimulus changes that don’t make a difference
when  the  subjects’  eyes  are  closed  or  in  the
dark or in a dust storm. So the proposal does
not  get  even  to  first  base  without  specifying
that  the circumstances of  perception must  be
ideal. 
Here is an example: Suppose one is looking
at an oriented line. If a change of up to but not
beyond plus or minus 1 degree makes no differ-
ence in the percept of the orientation in ideal
conditions, then the representational precision is
plus or minus 1 degree. And the same thought
also covers phenomenal precision. If a change of
up to but not beyond plus or minus 1 degree
makes  no  difference  in  the  phenomenology  of
the  percept  of  the  orientation  in  ideal  condi-
tions, then the phenomenal precision is plus or
minus 1 degree. One advantage of this concep-
tion  of  precision  is  that  representational  and
phenomenal precisions will be comparable. And
representationist  ideas  can  be  tested.  If  phe-
nomenal precisions are smaller, i.e.,  more pre-
cise than representational precisions, then rep-
resentationism is definitely over.
I  like  this  idea  of  precision  for  cases  in
which  it  is  fairly  clear  what  ideal  conditions
would consist in. But if one is concerned that
phenomenal precision is not a coherent notion,
this suggestion will not be of much help. The
problem with this suggestion is that the notion
of ideal conditions will inevitably smuggle in the
ideas  that  are supposedly being explained.  In
the case of representational content, the prob-
lem has often been called the “problem of error”
(Fodor 1987):  representational  states  correlate
best—not with their truth conditions—but with
conditions that include systematic error. A no-
tion of ideal conditions that avoided this con-
sequence  would  itself  have  to  distinguish
between veridical and falsidical representations
(see Adams & Aizawa 2010). 
Fink’s  proposal  about  phenomenal  preci-
sion  sometimes  sounds  like  the  correlational
idea just mentioned—that phenomenal precision
is  a  matter  of  how  much  the  stimulus  can
change without changing the phenomenal char-
acter of the subsequent perception in ideal cir-
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cumstances. However, Fink goes on to explicate
the notion of  change in the phenomenology of
the percept in terms of discernability: “for ex-
ample, the pain caused by 480mc/sec/cm2 is not
reliably  discernible  from  one  caused  by  640
mc/sec/cm2.” And he goes on to spell this out
in terms of the lower bound on p-precision be-
ing the range of cases “one cannot distinguish
by experiencing as F under ideal conditions.” (p.
8).  In  the  conclusion  of  the  paper,  Fink  de-
scribes his proposal in terms of the notion of a
“just  noticeable  difference  [JND]  as  a  lower
bound of p-precision.” (p. 12) 
However,  what  one  can distinguish  from
what is a matter not just of phenomenology but
of  an interaction between phenomenology and
cognition. As I noted (Block 2015, sections 6 &
10),  discriminability  is  neither  necessary  nor
sufficient  for  phenomenal  difference.  It  is  not
sufficient because there are sometimes ways of
discriminating between percepts that do not de-
pend on a phenomenological difference, such as
beats on vibrating strings. And it is not neces-
sary  because  not  all  phenomenological  differ-
ences need be accessible to the cognitive appar-
atus  of  the  subject.  I  mentioned  phenomenal
Sorites  cases  (Morrison 2015)  in  connection
with this point. As has often been noted, colors
A and B may be indistinguishable because the
difference between color A and color B is below
the JND. And B may be indistinguishable from
C for the same reason even though A is distin-
guishable from C. One way of thinking about
this is that A and B may actually look different
—i.e.,  produce  percepts  with  different  phe-
nomenologies, but the difference in phenomeno-
logies may be cognitively inaccessible. If so, no-
ticeable  differences  will  not  track phenomenal
differences.9
In short: phenomenal precision can be ex-
plicated  in  terms  of  the  extent  to  which  the
stimulus can change in ideal conditions without
changing  the  phenomenology  of  the  resulting
percept;  but  explaining  changes  in  the  phe-
nomenology of the percept in terms of noticing
or in terms of discrimination brings in an inter-
action with cognition that ruins the explication.
9 Fink seems to acknowledge such points in footnotes 14 and 22 but
somehow ignores them in explicating phenomenal precision.
I welcome Fink’s suggestions about how to
explicate phenomenal  precision so long as the
notions  of  discrimination  and  noticing  are
stripped from the explication and it is acknow-
ledged  that  we  have  no  reductive  account  of
ideal conditions. And I acknowledge the possib-
ility of solely generic phenomenology but I don’t
think it creates the problem Fink mentions for
my overflow arguments.
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